

Aristocracy, Fascism and the End of American History¹

I

Francis Fukuyama, the Japanese-American intellectual spokesman for the Jewish-American ‘Neoconservative’ movement, proclaimed in his 1992 book *The End of History and the Last Man* that liberal democracy was the final socio-political form since earlier alternatives such as Fascism and Communism had proven to be ideological failures, and liberty and equality had now been established as universal norms. Fukuyama's view of history moving in progressive political phases was of course first popularised in the nineteenth century by German thinkers like G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and their followers, who sought to discern historiographical patterns in the vagaries of military and economic fortune, and to either celebrate or revolt against the current political status of their own nation – in their case, Germany. To be sure, Hegel was somewhat more elevated than Marx in supposing the course of history to be the varying manifestations of a developing *Weltgeist*, or world-spirit, whereas Marx's materialist historiography was ruled by mere economic alterations.

Nevertheless, the falsehood of the Hegelian Marxist philosophy of history is made clear to anyone who considers the history of the country – **America** - which is promoting liberal democracy now as a universal norm when in fact aristocratic forms of government have for millennia constituted the political tradition of the Old World. From its inception as an independent nation, in America there has hardly been any deviation from liberal democratic goals, and Communism and Fascism have not only been absent there in their European forms but are, if ever they emerge, quickly absorbed into the nation's unchanging liberal democratic framework. What American society actually represents is a sort of ahistorical, quasi-Communist utopia where private individuals strive ever more strenuously to possess the means of production and to resist the interference of the state in public affairs. There is also little to distinguish the Communist ideal of equality from the liberal. When Fukuyama suggests that we have come to the ‘end of history’, what he therefore means is that the world that has undergone genuine historical changes has now been conquered by a country that began and continues as a utopia that is as little capable of historical change as of real progress; that is, progress understood not in the technological, but in the traditional sense of the development of the spiritual, intellectual, and social attitudes of a people.

The ‘end of history’ is indeed a phenomenon that is peculiar to America as a British colony that has had tenuous connections with the naturally developing history of the Old World. While most countries founded by colonial settlement manage to maintain and develop the culture of their mother nation to a certain extent – as Australia, for example, has done – America began and developed at a time of Protestant and Puritan revolt against the ancient Catholic monarchical traditions of Britain. It is therefore important to consider the phenomenon of Puritanism, which provoked the English Civil War at the time that America was being settled, and to notice the close connection between Christian Puritanism and Judaism.

¹ An earlier version of this essay was presented at the IV Encontro Internacional Evoliano conference in São Paulo, Brazil in September 2014.

We may recall in this context that the Jews, who had been officially expelled from England in 1290 by Edward I, were allowed by the Puritan dictator Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s to return from Holland, where they had been conducting a flourishing financial business. Throughout the Commonwealth, the Jews were held in high esteem by the Puritans. The similarity of the capitalist ethics developed by the Puritans to that of the Jews was noted in 1911 by the German sociologist Werner Sombart in his work *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*. Sombart maintained that the 'Protestant' ethic that Max Weber had focussed on in his 1905 work, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, was indeed to be identified specifically as a Puritan one that should be equated with Judaism. For, as Sombart explained,

In both will be found . . . the close relationship between religion and business, the arithmetical conception of sin, and, above all, the rationalization of life.²

With the American Civil War of 1861–65, the last links with monarchical England that had persisted in the pro-English South were cut by the victory of the federalist North. Then, in the aftermath of the Civil War, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Christian religious aspect of the original Puritan work-ethic of the Americans was seriously impaired by the large-scale influx of Jews from central and eastern Europe, who succeeded in modulating the philo-Semitic Puritan character of American capitalism into a fully Jewish one. As Sombart pointed out, the Jews had indeed been active in American economic life already from the seventeenth century, and had gradually come to monopolise many branches of American commerce such as the wheat, tobacco, and cotton trades. But we must note that with the increased immigration of eastern Jews at the end of the nineteenth century and the promotion of Jewish finance capitalism, what remained of the original Puritan work-ethic and concomitant frugality in the American economy was soon dissipated, while the only vestige of the dissident Puritanical religiosity that survived was its stubborn anti-clericalism.

With the replacement of the Puritan veneration of industry by the parasitical reign of finance, the Jewish tendency for economic utopianism which manifested itself in the twentieth century as totalitarian Communism in Russia, eastern Europe, and the Far East was transformed in the new 'promised land' of the Jews into the totalitarian liberalism of the 'American Dream'. As Sombart put it, 'what we call Americanism is nothing else, if we may say so, than the Jewish spirit distilled'.³ The capitalism promoted by the Jews steadily strengthened the nation's commitment to individualistic freedom and material aggrandisement rather than to the civilisational aims of the old monarchies and empires. Naturally, such a nation could not evolve or acquire a human history. Instead of producing examples of human greatness, it could only boast of a bourgeoisie that aspired to millionaire status and, instead of historical development, it could only experience periodic economic booms and recessions.

In his book, Fukuyama himself attempts to introduce a Nietzschean question into his glorification of liberal democracy by raising the spectre of the 'last man', or the average American-like man whose life is materially sated and spiritually meaningless. But with naïve optimism, he maintains that such an

² Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, p. 249.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

intolerably vacuous life will certainly be held at bay in a liberal democracy by man's spiritedness, a human characteristic that will inevitably rebel against such a monotonous existence. This spiritedness is the same as what Plato called the middle part of the tripartite soul, between its rational and animal parts. In the liberal democratic system, in Fukuyama's view, instead of this passionate energy's reappearance in violent strife, as in the case of nationalist or imperialistic states, there will be an absorption of it into sports, business, and political shows – such as election campaigns.

Fukuyama's belief in the sort of social engineering that liberal democracy universally aims at ignores the vast difference between the states of the Old World and the American. Indeed, the Neoconservative enterprise propagated by Fukuyama serves as a timely reminder of the incompatibility of the American with genuinely European systems of political thought. The American social values that are being imposed on Europe and the rest of the world via economic and military means are essentially alien ones, and are neither likely to take root easily nor endure. This is because, unlike the American nation, European and other older nations have a historical vitality that cannot be suffocated by American avarice. In order to illustrate this fact, I shall survey the characteristic political traditions of the Indo-Europeans and the contradictory intellectual movements that have distorted these traditions in the course of modern history.

II

To understand the traditional Indo-European social ethos, I may begin with the paradigmatic Āryan conception of society discernible in ancient India. The famous 'caste system' of the Indians is, unlike the modern Western 'class system', an entirely spiritual one, and men are recognised not by their economic status but by their hereditary spiritual capacity. The four Indian social orders are represented symbolically as the head, arms, thighs, and feet of the primordial cosmic anthropomorphic form of the divine Soul called Purusha. The manifestation of the Soul itself is understood to occur as a result of its three inherent forms of energy, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* – the first representing pure existence, the second motion, and the third inertia.⁴ Since there is an intimate and unavoidable correspondence between the macrocosm and the human microcosm, these three energies appear embodied in differing degrees among humans as well. The sattvic element most fully manifests in the brāhmins; the rājasic in the warriors, or kshatriyas; and the tāmasic in the vaisyas and shudras – particularly the latter. This is the original spiritual and psychological basis of all social hierarchy.

The brāhman owes his preeminent position in society to his superhuman spiritual power. Brahman, the deity who represents the Intellectual light of the cosmos, itself derives from a word denoting creative power, and it is the privilege and duty of the brāhman to represent this creative power. The kshatriyas, or political rulers and warriors, only serve to maintain this creative power, both within the land and also in the universe. The brāhman and kshatriya thus constitute the paradigmatic Indo-European polity centred on the dual organs of what in European politics are called Church and State. The people as such do not have a major political role, either as a bourgeoisie or as a proletariat.

If we turn to the Greek philosophers, we find that in Plato and Aristotle

⁴ *Brahmānda Purāna*, I,i,3,12.

the state is again constantly conceived of in terms of the constitution of the universal and individual soul. According to Plato, the soul is ‘that which moves itself’⁵ and is naturally prior to the body, since it ‘is what governs all the changes and modifications of bodies’.⁶

Just as in ancient India, the soul, or psyche, in Plato's *Republica* (Republic), Book IV, is divided into three parts: a higher rational or spiritual part (called *logistikon*), corresponding to the Indian *sattva*; a middle passionate one (called *thymoeides*), corresponding to *rajas*; and a lower sensual part (called *epithymetikon*), corresponding to *tamas*. Since society is as organic a phenomenon as the individuals of which it is composed, in a state as well the more the rational aspect predominates over the passionate, the closer it approximates to the ideal political form. But the discipline of the lower desires by the dictates of reason is to be found in only a few, and these are the ‘best born and the best educated’ men,⁷ whereas the untrained and untamed passions are to be found in abundance among children, women, and the lower classes, which form the largest section of society. The aristocratic ‘guardians’ of Plato's ideal republic are therefore required to be true philosophers, and will not be drawn from the inferior classes.

Aristotle continues Plato's spiritually-oriented political theory in his *Ethica Nichomachea* (Nicomachean Ethics), where he declares that the primary aim of politics is the attainment of the good of the nation. The higher classes of a nation will comprise the full citizens, who will assume the military and administrative – including priestly – offices of the land. The legislators must govern with a clear knowledge of the spiritual constitution of man; that is, the rational and passionate elements that Plato had discerned in the individual soul. And it is the duty of the legislators to ensure the predominance of the higher aspect of the soul over the lower.

Platonic principles reappear in the European Renaissance in the writings of aristocratic thinkers like Francesco Guicciardini and Jean Bodin. According to Guicciardini, who offered a critique of Niccolò Machiavelli in one of his works, *Considerazioni intorno ai ‘Discorsi’ del Machiavelli sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* (Considerations on the Discourses of Machiavelli, 1528), the chief reason that a prince and an aristocracy is superior to the people is that they are not subject to pernicious passions, such as – notably – envy. The French Renaissance philosopher Jean Bodin, who is notable for his championing of monarchical absolutism, also based his defence of the latter on a similar Platonic basis. Genuine monarchy is, according to him, derived from the Divine Law, and the monarch is the earthly image of God. Care should be taken that the religious foundation of the state is never brought into doubt, and religious leaders must act as censors of the state in order to maintain moral discipline within it.

It is at this juncture in world history that the revolutionary anti-monarchical ideas of the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution appear. If we study the American Bill of Rights of 1789, we realise that it was based largely on the English Bill of Rights of 1689 promulgated by the (originally Puritan) English Parliament after the ‘Glorious’ Protestant Revolution of 1688 in order to curb the powers traditionally invested in the formerly Catholic monarchs of England. One of the most influential English thinkers of the seventeenth century – and one generally considered to be the father of liberal

⁵ Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a.

⁶ Plato, *Laws*, 892a.

⁷ Plato, *Republica*, Book IV.

democracy – was John Locke, who was also a Puritan. Locke was a champion of the separation of the Church and State, and had a profound influence on the American ‘Founding Fathers’ such as Thomas Jefferson. The American Bill of Rights, based on the British parliamentary one, is especially notable for its dissociation (in the First Amendment) of the American state from any official religion. What had begun in England as a rejection of Catholicism was thus in America turned into a rejection of all official religion. Combined with this fear of theocracy was the Puritanical devotion to individual freedom and industry which caused the Americans to view citizenship as a status defined primarily by liberty, and citizens as economic units of production not unlike those of the later Communist utopia of Marx.

A little later, in the middle of the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau propagated the Lockean conception of government in France as a social ‘contract’ directed by the *volonté générale* of the people, which would reduce the inequalities springing from subservience to the state. However, a robust answer to Rousseau's doctrine of the ‘social contract’ was offered immediately after the fateful French Revolution by the English political philosopher Edmund Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), where he pointed out that

the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such low concern . . .⁸

And since the people cannot be relied upon to follow any ‘general will’ towards the attainment of the good of the nation, Burke proposed a natural aristocracy as the only viable national government. A strong nation is also necessarily a religious one for, as Burke said, all politicians indeed act on behalf of ‘the one great Master, Author and Founder of society’,⁹ namely God.

Religion's vital role in the conduct of states was reiterated in post-revolutionary France by the French monarchist Count Joseph de Maistre as well, who noted in his *Essai sur le principes générateur des constitutions politiques et des autres institutions humaines* (1809) that ‘the duration of empires has always been proportionate to the degree of influence the religious element gained in the political constitution.’¹⁰ Indeed, the truly political laws of a land are synonymous with the religious feelings of the people and the ‘instant [man] separates himself from God to act alone . . . he does not lose power . . . but his activity is negative and leads only to destruction’.¹¹ To follow the doctrines of Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau and Voltaire would thus result in a return to a state of anarchy and degeneracy.

In Germany around the same time, philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte were beginning to point to the crucial significance of **the ‘state’** as the means of enforcing an enlightened government. Kant took as his point of departure the excellence of Divine Law in relation to Natural Law, so that Reason, or the Moral Law, was elevated far above the mindless workings of Nature. To establish this rule of the Moral Law on earth, Kant proposed a supremely

⁸ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in *The Works of Edmund Burke* (Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1839), Chapter III, p. 120.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁰ ‘Essay’ in Joseph de Maistre, *On God and Society*, tr. E. Greifer (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1959), p. 42.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

powerful state that would control all religious and commercial offices in the land.

The leader of the state can never be a democratic representative of the people since democracy inevitably results in despotism. While Kant favoured a monarchical republic, Fichte advocated a Platonic philosopher-statesman who is at once a political and religious leader of his nation. Like a Platonic ‘guardian’, such a statesman

in his estimate of mankind looks beyond that which they are in the actual world to that which they are in the Divine Idea . . .¹²

The monarch will bear the responsibility for the realisation of the inner freedom of the individuals within his nation. It is important to note in this context Fichte's emphasis that the aim of all society is ‘ever-increasing ennoblement of the human race, that is, to set it more and more at liberty from the bondage of Nature’,¹³ just as the aim of all culture is ‘to subject Nature . . . to Reason’.¹⁴ In order to counteract the spurious freedom that the young in particular hanker after, Fichte insists that a new system of education must be developed which ‘essentially destroys the freedom of will . . . and produces on the contrary strict necessity in the decisions of the will’.¹⁵

The state continues to be glorified in Hegel's Idealistic philosophy. For Hegel the state – and especially the Prussian state – is the ‘embodiment of rational freedom realising and recognising itself in an objective form’.¹⁶ And in the Prussian nationalism of Heinrich von Treitschke, the state is glorified to an extent that it becomes a sort of substitute for God. Treitschke takes care to stress that ‘the consciousness of national unity is dependent on a common bond of religion, for religious sentiment is one of the fundamental forces of the human character’.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the interference of Jewish elements in German politics had disturbed the traditional spiritual ordering of society by encouraging ‘the coexistence of several religions within one nationality, involving an irreconcilable and ultimately intolerable difference of outlook upon life’.¹⁸

Directly opposed to these several statist doctrines of the German Idealists and nationalists is the doctrine of Communism, which was propounded in the middle of the nineteenth century by the Jewish political economist Karl Marx. The radical difference between the Marxist view of the world and the Indo-European is already evident in the fact that Marx's system was based on a materialism that totally denied the existence of any spiritual reality whatsoever, and all metaphysics in general, in favour of a dialectical socio-economics that attempted to understand the transformations of society according to its changing modes of production. Unlike Hegel, who had justified history as the changing manifestations of a quasi-divine world-spirit, Marx wished to ‘create’ history by focussing on what he considered its essential economic activities. As he put it in *The German Ideology*:

Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their

¹² ‘The Nature of the Scholar’, in *The Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, tr. W. Smith (London: J. Chapman, 1848), Vol. I, p. 290.

¹³ ‘The Vocation of the Scholar’, *loc. cit.*, p. 180.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁵ *Addresses to the German Nation*, tr. R. F. Jones & G. H. Turnbull (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1922), p. 20.

¹⁶ *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, tr. J. Sibree (London: George Bell and Sons, 1881), p. 49.

¹⁷ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics*, Vol. I, tr. A. J. Balfour (NY: Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 53.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 334.

corresponding forms of consciousness . . . have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.¹⁹

However, the Communist system, for all its apparent evolutionary aspirations, is an anti-scientific, utopian construct aiming at an anti-human classless and stateless society based on the common ownership of the means of production. In this delusional sociological experiment, Marx focused especially on class-struggle, or the conflict between capital and labour, as the primary instrument of historical change. By granting economic, social, and political equality to all citizens, Marx believed that the social awareness and discipline of every individual would naturally be increased. And, while he tolerated a representative parliamentary political system as a transitional stage, his Communist utopia aimed at a final dissolution of the state apparatus (which is what induces hierarchy and inequality) at the most advanced state of Communism, when the people would become fully self-governing.

Marxism is thus the fullest expression of a liberal world-view that is diametrically opposed to the traditional or conservative Indo-European ordering of society according to spiritual character which we have observed in ancient India, Greece, and the rest of Europe until the advent of Puritanism in the middle of the seventeenth century. Marxism is naturally also opposed to the state structure that supports the religious and warrior aristocracy that founded, constitutes, and preserves the nation. It may be noted here that, although modern liberal democracies pretend to abhor the Communist ideology, the arrogation of political powers in the West by the commercial middle class represents a major step towards the same dissolution of the concepts of national authority and sovereignty that Communism, too, strives for.

III

Marx's political economic theories were strongly criticised at the turn of the century by many notable German thinkers like Eugen Dühring and Oswald Spengler, but I should like to highlight here two of the most metaphysically structured political philosophical responses to Marxism – namely, the theories of the Italian Fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile and the pro-Fascist thinker Julius Evola.

According to Gentile, the basis of evil, exactly as in Plato and Plotinus, is matter, or nature, which is opposed to spirit and represents as it were

not merely moral and absolute nullity [but] the impenetrable chaos of brute nature, mechanism, spiritual darkness, falsehood and evil, all the things that man is forever fighting against.²⁰

Gentile points out that the economic life focussed on by Marx is marked by a utilitarianism akin to the instinctual life of animals and is a life of slavery to matter, whereas politics should be a means to spiritual freedom. Indeed, Marxism aimed at

¹⁹ Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 47.

²⁰ Giovanni Gentile, *Genesis and Structure of Society*, tr. H. S. Harris (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1946), p. 120.

the worst sort of social organisation, 'the utilitarian, materialistic and hence egoistic conception of life understood as a realm of rights to be vindicated, instead of as an arena of duties to be performed by sacrificing oneself to an ideal'.²¹ On the other hand, the Fascist understands life as being

serious, austere, religious; entirely balanced in a world sustained by the moral and responsible forces of the spirit. The Fascist disdains the 'easy life'.²²

Gentile's understanding of society is based on a Kantian ideal of a 'transcendent society', which is produced by the interaction of the ego and its pure object, the alter ego. It is this conception of a 'transcendent society' which makes man a 'political animal', as Aristotle had suggested. The gradual self-realisation of an individual necessarily entails the enlightenment of his objective counterparts, the other members of society, so that the nation as a whole begins to approach the ideal 'transcendent society'.

For Gentile, as for Fichte, the proper intellectual activity of the enlightened individual is the comprehension of the whole of mankind – or of the Idea of it. And **the 'state'** is the objective embodiment of the personality of the individuals constituting it, or the 'universal common aspect' of their will. As he explained in the introductory essay, 'Fundamental Ideas', to Benito Mussolini's *Dottrina politica e sociale del fascismo* (The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism), the state stands for 'the universal conscience and will of man in his historic existence'.²³ True political liberty is therefore possible only when the individuals that constitute the state become free through the realisation of the universal aspect of their personality.

The state in its universal aspect is indeed an image of the Divine Will, and the laws of the State must ever be in consonance with the Divine Law. Religion, naturally, is not an external aid to the will of the state, but its constitutive element. As he explained in 'Fundamental Ideas':

Fascism is a religious conception in which man is considered to be in the powerful grip of a superior law, with an objective will which transcends the particular individual and elevates him into a fully conscious member of a spiritual society.²⁴

The prime task of the state is to foster the dual development of individuals and of the society. As he put it, the Fascist state

reassumes all the forms of the moral and intellectual life of man. It cannot, therefore, be limited to a simple function of order and of safeguarding, as was contended by Liberalism. It is not a simple mechanism which limits the sphere of the presumed individual liberties. It is an internal form and rule, a discipline of the entire person: it penetrates the will as well as the intelligence. Its principle, a central inspiration of the living human personality in the civil community, descends into the depths and settles in the heart of the man of action as well as

²¹ 'What is Fascism?', in H. W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State* (NY: Howard Fertig, 1968), p. 350.

²² 'Fundamental Ideas', in Benito Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, tr. I. S. Munro, in *Readings on Fascism and National Socialism*, ed. A. Swallow (Columbus, OH: Swallow Press, 1984).

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

the thinker, of the artist as well as of the scientist . . .²⁵

Thus,

Fascism would . . . not be understood in many of its manifestations (as, for example, in its organisations of the Party, its system of education, its discipline) were it not considered in the light of its general view of life. A spiritualised view.

To Fascism the world is not this material world which appears on the surface, in which man is an individual separated from all other men, standing by himself and subject to a natural law which instinctively impels him to lead a life of momentary and egoistic pleasure. In Fascism man is an individual who is the nation and the country. He is this by a moral law which embraces and binds together individuals and generations in an established tradition and mission, a moral law which suppresses the instinct to lead a life confined to a brief cycle of pleasure in order, instead, to replace it within the orbit of duty in a superior conception of life, free from the limits of time and space, a life in which the individual by self-abnegation and by the sacrifice of his particular interests, even by death, realises the entirely spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists.²⁶

For the Fascist views on the formation of an **elite** or aristocracy in a modern state, we may rely on the views of the other Italian thinker, Julius Evola, whose commentaries on Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany contain invaluable counsels on statecraft.²⁷ Though Evola criticised Gentile for what he considered to be the moralist aspect of Gentile's state, both thinkers place an equal emphasis on the transcendental dimension of the state. Evola notes this aspect especially in the Fascist conception of the state rather than in the National Socialist one:

in Fascist political doctrine . . . [t]he state was recognised as possessing pre-eminence in respect to people and nation, that is, the dignity of a single superior power through which the nation acquires a real self-awareness, possesses a form and a will, and participates in a supernatural order.²⁸

As Gentile had stated,

the nation does not beget the State, according to the decrepit nationalistic concept which was used as a basis for the publicists of the national States in the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the nation is created by the State, which gives the people, conscious of their own moral unity, the will, and thereby an effective existence.²⁹

In National Socialist Germany, on the other hand, the racial nation took precedence over the state, which had in fact been represented earlier by the Prussian state of the Hohenzollerns:

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ See Julius Evola, *Fascism viewed from the Right*, tr. E. Christian Kopff (London: Arktos, 2013), and *Notes on the Third Reich*, tr. E. Christian Kopff (London: Arktos, 2013).

²⁸ *Fascism viewed from the Right*, p. 32.

²⁹ Gentile, 'Fundamental Ideas', *loc. cit.*

. . . Prussia had been the creation of a dynasty that had the nobility, the army and the higher bureaucracy for its backbone. The primary element was not the 'nation' or the *Volk*. Rather the state, more than the land or the ethnos, constituted the real foundation and unifying principle. There was none of that in Hitlerism – at least in the area of general political ideology. The state was conceived as a secondary and instrumental reality, while the primary formative, moving and bearing force was supposed to be the *Volk* with the *Führer* as its representative and incarnation.³⁰

A merely populist state is in fact a counterfeit version of the Fascist state, since it is a 'mass state' characterized by

collectivising and demagogic movements with an excitable and sub-rational foundation, which can also give to the individual the illusory, momentary sensation of an exalted, intense life, likewise conditioned by sensation, by a regression, and by a reduction of personality and true liberty.³¹

Evola aptly cites the German writer Ernst von Salomon (1902-1972) in order to show that populist nationalism is incompatible with a conservative political one:

There could not be, from the historical point of view, any bridge between the state idea and the populist one of the essence of the nation. This fact, unfortunately, was disguised by the disorienting circumstance that the populist formula used the same vocabulary and boasted of being a renewed conception of the state.³²

Not having a very strong notion of the state, the Third Reich was also incapable of establishing a supra-national state structure such as the Habsburg Empire pre-eminently had done. The National Socialist slogan of '*Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Führer*' was perhaps adequate for pan-Germanist aims, but not for a pan-European one. This inadequacy was especially compounded by the doctrines of Nordic supremacy that made enemies of fellow European nations – such as the Poles, most notably – that could have been turned instead into allies against the Communist state.

That the state is distinct from the nation and the *Gemeinschaft* (the 'community' of Ferdinand Tönnies) does not mean that it is identical to the *Gesellschaft* (society), either. In fact, Evola clearly identifies the societal focus of liberal political theory as its greatest defect:

In reality, there is a fundamental antithesis of doctrine between political systems that focus on the idea of the state and those that focus on the idea of 'society' (the 'social' type of state). The second type of system includes the varieties of theories based upon the concept of natural rights, contract theory with a utilitarian base, and democracy, with the related developments that stretch from liberal democracy to the so-called 'people's democracies', that is, Marxist and Communist ones.³³

A Fascist state, on the other hand, is concerned with the 'transcendence' that

³⁰ Evola, *Notes on the Third Reich*, p. 37.

³¹ Evola, *Fascism viewed from the Right*, p. 48.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

can be achieved only through heroic or military virtues such as ‘honour and loyalty’ that are ‘not only beyond hedonistic values (those of simple material well-being), but also eudemonistic ones (that is, ones including spiritual well-being)’. Evola goes on to add that even

[i]f it is not possible to ask everyone to follow an ‘ascetic and military vision of life’, it will be possible to aim at a climate of concentrated intensity, of personal life, that will encourage people to prefer a greater margin of liberty, as opposed to comfort and prosperity . . .³⁴

The Fascist state, as an organic rather than a mechanical creation, is centralised, but not totalitarian, and allows individual liberty except ‘when it is necessary to rein in a shapeless and atomistic mass of individuals and wills’.³⁵ In a Fascist state, which is directed against both capitalism and Communism, the centre will be constituted of a principle of authority and a transcendent symbol of sovereignty. The most natural incarnation of such a symbol is the monarchy. However,

[m]onarchy is not incompatible with a ‘legal dictatorship’, more or less as it was in ancient Roman law. The sovereign can confer exceptional unitary powers on a person of special stature and qualification, still on a legal basis, when there are special situations to overcome or exceptional tasks to confront.³⁶

Thus, when lacking an effective monarch (*rex*), a state can substitute a ‘dictator’ (*dux*), who however acts ‘by the legitimate and pre-existing system of order, essentially destined to integrate it in case of necessity’ in order to consolidate ‘a particular concentration and activation of existing forces’.³⁷ This leader, too, cannot be a modern ‘man of the people’ (as in the case of National Socialism or Communism, or in the present American presidential system), where

People only put up with the leader who is, essentially, ‘one of us’, who is ‘one of the people’, who expresses the ‘will of the people’, who is a ‘good friend’.³⁸

The democratic system of endlessly fluctuating party politics is to be firmly rejected even though the parliamentary framework may be retained – albeit in a higher aristocratic form. That is, **the upper parliamentary house**, or the House of Lords, should serve as the essential government of the nation and be constituted of an elite that corresponds to the ancient Indo-European offices of the priest and the warrior. This elite,

by inserting itself into the normal and essential hierarchies of the state and eventually controlling it, . . . bears, to an eminent degree, the idea [of the state]. In this last case, more than a ‘party’ it will be appropriate to speak of a kind of ‘order’. This is the same function that in other times was exercised by the nobility as a political class . . .³⁹

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

Though representing the nobility in the modern world, the elite occupying the upper House of Parliament ‘will also act as the guardian of the idea of the state, and will prevent the “caesarean” isolation of whoever exercises the supreme authority.’⁴⁰

The Lower House of Parliament should be constituted not of parties that have gained entrance through the weight of popular votes, but of corporate ‘bodies’, including the several economic ones, which are all characterised by their ‘function and dignity’. Just as the Upper House will serve as an advisory council to the King or President, the Lower will work in coordination with the ministers and the Prime Minister.

The task of the Upper House is first of all to establish its control over the economic powers of the land that are vested primarily in the middle class:

The sphere of politics and power should be, by its very nature and function, free from economic influences, influences by economic groups or special interests. It is appropriate to recall the statement of Sulla, who said that his ambition was not to possess gold, but to hold power over those who possess it.⁴¹

This hierarchical constitution of the Parliament will preclude the domination of the interests of the lower orders, including the bourgeois ones. As Evola points out, a Fascist state should take care

[o]n the one hand ... to eliminate the proletarian and Marxist influences on the worker, and on the other to destroy the purely ‘capitalist’ mentality of the entrepreneur.⁴²

In general, what Evola desires is a total reformation of industrial society in a heroic/military fashion

against the Marxist and materialist mentality, the same type of ‘military’ attitude in the general sense, of which we have spoken earlier, could be made equally effective on the level of work and production.⁴³

The urgent task of restoring the primacy of politics over economics can be achieved through strictly controlling ‘the monstrous development of capitalism in the direction of unfettered productivity’ so that it is

limited, with the ultimate end of restoring the economy, and everything that is economic, to the subordinate position in which it becomes only a means to an end, and a circumscribed dominion within a much vaster hierarchy of values and interests.⁴⁴

Industry’s craving for unlimited change should be reined in by the state so as to allow

progress or movement in a ‘vertical’ direction, for the realisation of higher possibilities and the true autonomy of the person . . .⁴⁵

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

The aim of the Fascist state should indeed be the Stoic ideal of ‘autarky’, or

an ethics of independence or the sovereignty of the individual. In order to guard this value, where it was necessary, one had to follow the strict principle of *abstine et sustine*.⁴⁶

The national economy, too, should be marked by ‘austerity’ in the sense of

if necessary, holding the general standard of living relatively low, adopting what the English call ‘austerity’, which, even in a different context, has had to be practiced here and there by different nations after the Second World War, but assuring ourselves a maximum of independence.⁴⁷

Thus, as regards the life of the nation in general,

we hold the normal situation to be the complete opposite of everything we are witnessing today: apparently generalised prosperity and thoughtless living from day to day beyond one’s means, along with a frightening state debt balance, leading to extreme economic and social instability, growing inflation and an invasion of foreign capital which brings with it many important visible and invisible influences.⁴⁸

Only a state pitched at the level of spiritual ‘transcendence’ can foster ‘the development of personality and true liberty in the sense of *virtus*,⁴⁹ according to the Classical understanding’.⁵⁰ As Evola explains,

[i]n truth, personality and liberty can be conceived only on the basis of the individual’s freeing himself, to a certain degree, from the naturalistic, biological and primitively individualist bonds that characterise the pre-state and pre-political forms [directed] in a purely social, utilitarian and contractual sense.⁵¹

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In these Fascist conceptions of history and of the philosophical significance of the state we see thus the diametrical opposite of the liberal American way of life. They, further, provide a powerful corrective to the historiographical errors of Hegelians like Fukuyama who raise the political *status quo* to an ideal after superficially surveying the external changes of a state, as also to the errors of the Marxists who conjure up utopias from these same changes. All of these thinkers ignore the transcendent or divine aspect of statecraft, which, as we have observed in our initial survey of ancient Indian and Greek philosophy, also provides the true basis of the necessary hierarchical organisation of society. The state should ever bear in mind the constitution of the psyche or soul itself and aim, through a sacred kingship or an enlightened aristocracy, or elite, at the psychological improvement of the individuals that comprise the state.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88 (Latin: ‘abstain and sustain’).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Latin: ‘manly virtue’.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

Materialistic societies governed by economically oriented political doctrines, whether Puritan, Marxist, or capitalist, are incapable of any real historical development because the spiritual element of man – which alone is capable of movement and development – is not best tended by either the middle or the lower classes but only by an upper class constituted of what the British aptly call the ‘lords spiritual and temporal’. Fukuyama's historiographic thesis is thus merely a description of the abortive state of America itself, which has through its history gradually substituted materialistic and economic principles of statecraft for the spiritual ones that originally governed all European monarchies, including the British. The current acceleration of these principles through technological advances by American entrepreneurs like Bill Gates and Elon Musk – towards a communistic utopia of global governance and surveillance - is indeed the final confirmation of the lifeless, and vampiristic, condition of American society and culture.

In considering this American problem, we have noted the fateful role that the Jewish bourgeoisie have played in the history of the West, for the re-entry of the Jews into England during the Puritan revolution is psychologically linked to the capitalist career of the new American state, as well as to its inevitable transformation into a bourgeois oligarchy. Indeed, all modern political theories that aim at a diminution or dissolution of the state or of the leading religious institution of a nation, whether these theories are called libertarian, populist, or anarchist, may be recognised as derivatives of the defective Jewish economic mentality, which is also responsible for the social degeneration generally associated with modernism.

This mentality can, and should, be fully replaced by genuinely Indo-European political doctrines that are not enunciated by the bourgeoisie in the name of the people, but by the non-mercantile, aristocratic section of the population that alone can serve as the leaders of a cultured state. Indeed, the primary task of a political constitution should be the preservation of the spiritual eminence of the highest political bodies of the state as well as of those strata of the population that they represent. Further, the alliance of both the state and its leading religious institution – in the West's case, the Church – must be consolidated and their role strengthened through the Upper House of the Parliament. The current parliamentary structure of government should be reorganised so that the economic concerns of the Lower House and of the Prime Minister's cabinet are dominated by the more aristocratic ones of an Upper House dedicated to the elevation of the idea of the state and its people. This can be effected only through a strict exclusion of all anti-statist, technocratic elements – concentrated among the Jewish oligarchies and bourgeoisie – from the higher echelons of government and society.

The philosophical guidelines for the regeneration of nations are already to be found in the long tradition of European conservative philosophy that I have surveyed, and that come to a sharp focus in the Fascist doctrines of Gentile and Evola. Of course, Fascism – lazily conflated with National Socialism – has today become a term that is abhorrent to those who blindly follow Judaised America in its various utopian adventures. But it is well to bear in mind that the price of American utopianism is the end of history.